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But there are well-known instances in which it fails. For ‘F’ substitute ‘You know…to be your brother’, for ‘x’ substitute ‘your brother’ and for ‘y’ substitute ‘this man wearing a hood’, and suppose that your brother is indeed the man in question wearing a hood. This delivers the ancient paradox of the Hooded Man (and also reminds us of why the police want ‘hoodies’ banned in shopping malls in England). Again, for ‘F’ substitute ‘Hammurabi believes that … is identical with the Morning Star’; for ‘x’, ‘The Morning Star’ and for ‘y’, ‘The Evening Star’. This delivers a variant of a famous puzzle due to Frege, for, as readers of this bulletin know (but Hammurabi didn’t), The Morning Star=The Evening Star=Phosphorus=Hesperus=Venus.
	The examples just cited are of intensional (propositional attitude) contexts that are said to be ‘referentially opaque’. Since, in each case, the reasoning from premises to conclusion is no good, it might seem that what we need is an intensional logic that declares the inference invalid (e.g. Graham Priest, ‘The Hooded Man’, http://www.springerlink.com/content/l45510h61x8014m6/ (​http:​/​​/​www.springerlink.com​/​content​/​l45510h61x8014m6​/​​)). But there are two difficulties with this suggestion. First, the non-substitutivity phenomenon (i.e. the fact that we may not preserve the truth-value of ‘Fa’ if, for ‘a’ we substitute the co-referential ‘b’) does not appear to be restricted to intensional contexts. Superman flies. Superman is identical with Clark Kent. But Clark Kent doesn’t fly. No mention of intension. Similarly, we are inclined to say (of course, such inclinations and intuitions need to be examined) that Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent, but obviously she did not kiss Superman before she kissed Superman, so the argument to that conclusion is invalid. (This type of example was first introduced into the literature by Jenny Saul.)  Second, an intensional logic, like any other formal logic, studies the form of arguments, and, if the form of an argument is declared valid (invalid) then every argument of that form is declared valid (invalid). Yet it appears that there are arguments that share the form of the ‘kissing Superman’ one, but that are valid. As Julia Tanney (blog: https://webct.kent.ac.uk/webct/urw/lc4130001.tp0/cobaltMainFrame.dowebct (​https:​/​​/​webct.kent.ac.uk​/​webct​/​urw​/​lc4130001.tp0​/​cobaltMainFrame.dowebct​)) elegantly explains:

Normally, I would be very sympathetic with the claim that there was a time, t1, at which Lois kissed Superman but not (yet) Clark Kent. I note however that the sense in which Lois (at t1) had not (yet) kissed Clark Kent would be the same as that in which Oedipus, although having slept with Jocasta had not slept with his mother. But Jocasta hanged herself and Oedipus gouged out his eyes because there was no question for them of not accepting substitutivity. 

The only noteworthy change from the first (kissing) argument to the second is that, sexually, we have moved from second base to fourth, but the arguments have a common structure — yet differ in validity-value. And this is traceable to the fact that we think ‘Oedipus slept with Jocasta before he slept with his mother’ is false. So it seems that the formal logical (non-semantic, non-pragmatic) route to solving the substitutivity problem is a dead end. 
Difficult problems sometimes attract desperate measures for dealing them. One might, for example, simply brush aside the non-intensional cases — since Clark Kent really is Superman, if one of them flies then so does the other, because he’s not really ‘other’, but exactly the same guy. As for intensional contexts, one could say, as Frege did, that, in such contexts, a referring expression does not refer to its normal referent, but to something entirely different — its sense (Sinn). In Frege’s theory two expressions that refer to the same object may nevertheless possess different senses. The sense (Sinn) of a referring expression is, roughly speaking, the way to locate its referent. Hence, even when a=b, for intensional ‘F’, the statements ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ may be about different subjects (different Sinne) and hence may differ in truth-value.
Frege’s solution smells badly of adhocery and, besides, his theory about the senses of names has been refuted (well, as close as anything gets to being refuted in philosophy) by a clutch of delightfully clear arguments marshalled by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity. However if, under the influence of Kripke, you become a Direct Reference theorist, holding that the sole semantic contribution made by a proper name is to name the name’s bearer, then, if you are willing to assert that Lois believes that Superman flies, you must also say that the statement ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ is true, and somehow persuade yourself and others that those who think it false are making a certain kind of mistake. This also does not look like a good road to follow.
I have sketched some versions of the problem of non-substitutivity and indicated that the two standard approaches to the problem fail. Where does that leave us? We noticed a difference between the case of Lois kissing Superman and that of Oedipus sleeping with Jocasta. Here’s another difference to consider: Lois is ignorant of the fact that Clark Kent is Superman, and so we (or most of us, anyway) want to say that someone who tells us ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ is speaking falsely. But suppose that I am addressing someone whom I know [knows Clark Kent, often sees him donning his supersuit, but does not know that, when suited up, he goes under the name of ‘Superman’, and may not even know that, when so kitted out, he flies]. I could speak the truth (and intend to speak the truth) by telling that person: ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’. Two token utterances of the same type sentence, but differing in truth-value on different occasions of use. If the editor permits, I shall, in the next issue of this bulletin, try to show how the non-substitutivity problem is solved by attending to the difference that context makes to the meaning of an utterance.


